The role of parliamentary committees and legislative agreements in party bargaining during minority government in Denmark

Danish legislative committees are almost negligible as settings for negotiations and policy compromises, so-called legislative agreements (politiske forlig in Danish) between opposition parties and minority governments. Why is this so? And, why do some opposition parties refrain from actively using the powers of legislative committees as a setting for control activities? The chapter draws on theories of bargaining and of agenda-setting. During bargaining political parties may need space for evaluation of proto-deals without being subject to public scrutiny and attacks from other parties not involved in the bargaining. For that purpose, legislative committees are most likely too public since all members possess the same formal rights. Instead, a minority government and selected opposition parties may instead develop informal settings for policy influence and control, limited to ‘the cartels’ of parties that take part. This characterizes the Danish tradition of legislative agreements. From an agenda-setting perspective, the chapter points out that when minority governments form deals with opposition parties, they not only offer policy influence in return for passing of policy, they also buy silence on the political agenda that in particular opposition parties are able to influence. The chapter analyses several important aspects of relations between minority government and legislative committees on the one hand and bargaining on the other, drawing on interviews with MPs as well as quantitative measures. The chapter shows that actual legislative bargaining in Denmark normally takes place inside the ministries, supported by an informal yet highly institutionalized practice of making legislative deals between government and opposition parties. The role of legislative committees in this regard is rather limited and to some extent invisible. Committee members from party groups not participating in the bargaining process get much less information than party groups in legislative agreements do, and seem to be far more dependent on the committees as a political instrument.