Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs

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Abstract

The literature on first-order false-belief is extensive, but less is known about the second-order case. The ability to handle second-order false-beliefs correctly seems to mark a cognitively significant step, but what is its status? Is it an example of *complexity only* development, or does it indicate that a more fundamental *conceptual change* has taken place? In this paper we extend Braüner's hybrid-logical analysis of first-order false-belief tasks to the second-order case, and argue that our analysis supports a version of the conceptual change position.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCogSci 2016 Proceedings : 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events
EditorsAnna Papafragou, Daniel Grodner, Daniel Mirman, John Trueswell
Number of pages6
Place of PublicationPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
PublisherCognitive Science Society
Publication date2016
Pages2579-2584
ISBN (Print)978-0-9911967-3-9
Publication statusPublished - 2016
Event38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting: Recognizing and Representing Events - Philadelphia Convention Center , Philadelphia, United States
Duration: 10 Aug 201613 Aug 2016
http://www.cognitivesciencesociety.org/2015/09/26/cogsci-2016-recognizing-and-representing-events/

Conference

Conference38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting
LocationPhiladelphia Convention Center
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPhiladelphia
Period10/08/201613/08/2016
Internet address

Keywords

  • Second-order false-belief tasks
  • belief formation
  • belief manipulation
  • complexity only
  • conceptual change
  • hybrid logic
  • natural deduction
  • recursion

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