Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs

Torben Braüner; Patrick Rowan Blackburn; Irina Polyanskaya

Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs

Torben Braüner, Patrick Rowan Blackburn, Irina Polyanskaya

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

Abstract

The literature on first-order false-belief is extensive, but less is known about the second-order case. The ability to handle second-order false-beliefs correctly seems to mark a cognitively significant step, but what is its status? Is it an example of *complexity only* development, or does it indicate that a more fundamental *conceptual change* has taken place? In this paper we extend Braüner's hybrid-logical analysis of first-order false-belief tasks to the second-order case, and argue that our analysis supports a version of the conceptual change position.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	CogSci 2016 Proceedings : 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events
Editors	Anna Papafragou, Daniel Grodner, Daniel Mirman, John Trueswell
Place of Publication	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
Publisher	Cognitive Science Society
Publication date	2016
Pages	2579-2584
ISBN (Print)	978-0-9911967-3-9
Publication status	Published - 2016
Event	38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting: Recognizing and Representing Events - Philadelphia Convention Center , Philadelphia, United States Duration: 10 Aug 2016 → 13 Aug 2016 http://www.cognitivesciencesociety.org/2015/09/26/cogsci-2016-recognizing-and-representing-events/

Conference

Conference	38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting
Location	Philadelphia Convention Center
Country/Territory	United States
City	Philadelphia
Period	10/08/2016 → 13/08/2016
Internet address	http://www.cognitivesciencesociety.org/2015/09/26/cogsci-2016-recognizing-and-representing-events/

Link to document

Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefsFinal published version, 144 KB

https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2016/papers/0445/paper0445.pdf

Hybrid-Logical Proofs at Work in Cognitive Psychology
Braüner, T., Blackburn, P. R. & Polyanskaya, I.
VELUX FONDEN
01/01/2014 → 30/04/2019
Project: Research

Cite this

Braüner, T., Blackburn, P. R., & Polyanskaya, I. (2016). Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs. In A. Papafragou, D. Grodner, D. Mirman, & J. Trueswell (Eds.), CogSci 2016 Proceedings: 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events (pp. 2579-2584). Cognitive Science Society. https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2016/papers/0445/paper0445.pdf

Braüner, Torben ; Blackburn, Patrick Rowan ; Polyanskaya, Irina. / Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs. CogSci 2016 Proceedings: 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events. editor / Anna Papafragou ; Daniel Grodner ; Daniel Mirman ; John Trueswell. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA : Cognitive Science Society, 2016. pp. 2579-2584

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abstract = "The literature on first-order false-belief is extensive, but less is known about the second-order case. The ability to handle second-order false-beliefs correctly seems to mark a cognitively significant step, but what is its status? Is it an example of *complexity only* development, or does it indicate that a more fundamental *conceptual change* has taken place? In this paper we extend Bra{\"u}ner's hybrid-logical analysis of first-order false-belief tasks to the second-order case, and argue that our analysis supports a version of the conceptual change position. ",

author = "Torben Bra{\"u}ner and Blackburn, {Patrick Rowan} and Irina Polyanskaya",

year = "2016",

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editor = "Anna Papafragou and Daniel Grodner and Daniel Mirman and John Trueswell",

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Braüner, T , Blackburn, PR & Polyanskaya, I 2016, Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs. in A Papafragou, D Grodner, D Mirman & J Trueswell (eds), CogSci 2016 Proceedings: 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events. Cognitive Science Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, pp. 2579-2584, 38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting, Philadelphia, United States, 10/08/2016. <https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2016/papers/0445/paper0445.pdf>

Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs. / Braüner, Torben ; Blackburn, Patrick Rowan; Polyanskaya, Irina.

CogSci 2016 Proceedings: 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events. ed. / Anna Papafragou; Daniel Grodner; Daniel Mirman; John Trueswell. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA : Cognitive Science Society, 2016. p. 2579-2584.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

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T1 - Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs

AU - Braüner, Torben

AU - Blackburn, Patrick Rowan

AU - Polyanskaya, Irina

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AB - The literature on first-order false-belief is extensive, but less is known about the second-order case. The ability to handle second-order false-beliefs correctly seems to mark a cognitively significant step, but what is its status? Is it an example of *complexity only* development, or does it indicate that a more fundamental *conceptual change* has taken place? In this paper we extend Braüner's hybrid-logical analysis of first-order false-belief tasks to the second-order case, and argue that our analysis supports a version of the conceptual change position.

M3 - Article in proceedings

SN - 978-0-9911967-3-9

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EP - 2584

BT - CogSci 2016 Proceedings

A2 - Papafragou, Anna

A2 - Grodner, Daniel

A2 - Mirman, Daniel

A2 - Trueswell, John

PB - Cognitive Science Society

CY - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA

T2 - 38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting

Y2 - 10 August 2016 through 13 August 2016

ER -

Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs

Abstract

Conference

Link to document

Projects

Hybrid-Logical Proofs at Work in Cognitive Psychology

Cite this