Projects per year
The literature on first-order false-belief is extensive, but less is known about the second-order case. The ability to handle second-order false-beliefs correctly seems to mark a cognitively significant step, but what is its status? Is it an example of *complexity only* development, or does it indicate that a more fundamental *conceptual change* has taken place? In this paper we extend Braüner's hybrid-logical analysis of first-order false-belief tasks to the second-order case, and argue that our analysis supports a version of the conceptual change position.
|Title of host publication||CogSci 2016 Proceedings : 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events|
|Editors||Anna Papafragou, Daniel Grodner, Daniel Mirman, John Trueswell|
|Place of Publication||Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA|
|Publisher||Cognitive Science Society|
|Publication status||Published - 2016|
|Event||38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting: Recognizing and Representing Events - Philadelphia Convention Center , Philadelphia, United States|
Duration: 10 Aug 2016 → 13 Aug 2016
|Conference||38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting|
|Location||Philadelphia Convention Center|
|Period||10/08/2016 → 13/08/2016|
- 1 Finished
Hybrid-Logical Proofs at Work in Cognitive Psychology
Braüner, T., Blackburn, P. R. & Polyanskaya, I.
01/01/2014 → 30/04/2019