We study the governance mechanisms of three Payments for Environmental Services (PES) projects in Madagascar (one for biodiversity, two for water). The paper focuses on upstream transaction costs to design the governance mechanisms and involve stakeholders. We show that the water-PES with the most comprehensive governance mechanisms is also the one with the highest transactions costs. This is a paradox for New Institutional Economics since this PES is the the most rational and opportunistic one to undertake for all stakeholders. The other water-PES has lower transaction costs, much less comprehensive governance mechanisms and a higher number of conflicts amongst stakeholders. We highlight the importance of the local institutional path to explain this paradox.
| Translated title of the contribution | Governance of payments for environmental services in Madagascar: insights from institutional analysis |
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| Original language | French |
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| Volume | 2011-6 |
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| Publication status | Published - 2011 |
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| Externally published | Yes |
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| Series | Programme Serena, document de travail |
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