Bounded rationality, information, legal protection, and non-trivial contractual problems: Their influence on interorganizational relations

Carsten Allan Koch

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperResearch


    This paper attempts to generalize findings of the traditional literature of transaction cost economics (Willamson, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1985; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson & Ouchi 1981) by introducing more general factors or variables. Two of the most important of these are that asset specificity is replaced by a more general condition, vulnerability, and that the so-called market failure condition is replaced by a condition called contractual non-triviality. Sufficient conditions for non-triviality are found in terms of specific set of values for the basic set of factors.
    Original languageEnglish
    Publication date21 Aug 1992
    Number of pages39
    Publication statusPublished - 21 Aug 1992
    Event2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research - Yxtaholm, Sweden
    Duration: 21 Aug 199223 Aug 1992
    Conference number: 2


    Conference2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research


    • Asset specificity
    • Bounded rationality
    • Complexity
    • Contract
    • Goal incongruence
    • Human behaviour
    • Incomplete contracting
    • Market failure
    • Mechanisms of protection
    • Opportunism
    • Ouchi, W.G.
    • Relational contracting
    • Transaction
    • Transaction cost
    • Uncertainty
    • Williamson, Oliver E.

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