In this thesis I defend the view that no one is ever morally responsible for anything, in the sense that could make one deserve to suffer blame or punishment (or to be less happy). In essence, I argue that we do not have the kind of free will, or control, that moral responsibility requires. I do this by defending a version of the Basic Argument by Galen Strawson, and I use findings from neuroscience to add plausibility to this argument. I also draw on insights from social psychology to explain why we might feel free and morally responsible even though we are not. Lastly, I discuss and reject a moral objection to my thesis: that people would become immoral if they stopped believing in free will and moral responsibility.
|Uddannelser||Filosofi og Videnskabsteori, (Bachelor/kandidatuddannelse) Kandidat|
|Udgivelsesdato||15 mar. 2013|
- Moral responsibility
- Free will