Reason for writing: A mutual interest in the philosophy of Wittgenstein has prompted us to undertake an examination into the Philosophical Investigations and, more specifically, the Private Language Argument, where we endeavor to explore possible refutations of Wittgenstein’s argument.
Theory: Throughout our enquiry we will explore Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in the Philosophical Investigations and try to outline a clear argumentation in Wittgenstein’s private language argument. In this, we will propose a reading of Wittgenstein and compare this to the reading of Saul Kripke. Furthermore, we will look at David Papineau’s argument against Wittgenstein from the standpoint of phenomenal-concept-theory. Problem: Does David Papineau’s counter-argument refute Wittgenstein private language argument and if not, does Wittgenstein’s argument hold true?
Methodology: We will meticulously try to deconstruct Wittgenstein’s arguments from a myriad of paragraphs from Philosophical Investigations and cross-examine these. In examining Papineau’s argument we’ll correspondingly look at various contemporary philosophers. With the aid of various thought-experiments we will attempt to shed light on a general understanding of the ‘inner’ and correspondingly construct an experiment of our own to unfold our findings.
Findings: We conclude that Papineau’s argument doesn’t refute Wittgenstein’s argument, since it relies on a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein. However, we propose that Wittgenstein’s argument can be challenged since we can construe a scenario in which a private language is logically possible.
|Uddannelser||Filosofi og Videnskabsteori, (Bachelor/kandidatuddannelse) Kandidat|
|Udgivelsesdato||26 maj 2019|
- Wittgenstein, Papineau, Philosophical Investigations, Private Language, The ‘inner’, philosophy of mind.