This paper aims to investigate and problematize the two different approaches to human rights presented by James Griffin and John Tasioulas. They agree on the need for a new philosophical grounding of the human rights, because they both find the human right tradition to be indeterminate in sense. This paper unfolds the two different approaches in order to explore their theoretical differences and present their different philosophical implications for understanding and dealing with human rights. Based on the variance in the two theories, this paper will outweigh and discuss the possibilities and limits in their approaches towards describing universal human rights. The account presented by Griffin allows a somehow determinate definition of the fundamental components in human rights, but the objection would be, that this definition is too narrow to capture all universal values. The account presented by Tasioulas acknowledges the plurality of human interests and values. This complicates the applicability in forming tangible human rights, when the boundaries between the universal and particular values are undefined by Tasioulas.
|Uddannelser||Filosofi og Videnskabsteori, (Bachelor/kandidatuddannelse) Bachelor el. kandidat|
|Udgivelsesdato||20 jan. 2016|