Abstract: In his seminal work, Mind and World (1994), John McDowell argues, that in order for experience to be able to justify beliefs, the contents of perceptual experience have to be conceptual contents, that are accessible and embraceable by cognitive processes (thoughts). This position, known as Conceptualism, has in recent years been the subject of criticism from philosophers who defend a variety of positions under the umbrella of non-conceptualism. Non-conceptualist defend the view, that all, or at least some, of the representational contents that figures in experience are concept independent contents or concept independent states. Non-conceptualist e.g argue, that perceptual contents are too finely grained and too rich in character to be dependent of concepts that are cognitively available to the experiencing subject.
In this thesis i examine some of the motives for defending conceptualism and some of the motives for defending non-conceptualism. I examine arguments that have been put forward on both sides of the debate, and i argue, that while arguments for non-conceptualism might seem appealing at first glance, they pose no serious threat to the conceptualist positions defended by McDowell and his peers. Additionally i argue, that while the conceptualists are able to defend their position against said arguments, these defense strategies do not amount to any positive arguments for Conceptualism.
|Uddannelser||Filosofi og Videnskabsteori, (Bachelor/kandidatuddannelse) Kandidat|
|Udgivelsesdato||3 apr. 2018|
- conceptualism, non-conceptualism