In this paper we argue that the hard problem of consciousness certainly is a hard problem in many respects, but that the proposed hardness might derive from David Chalmers’ anti-scientific stance in regards to his theories. Furthermore, we argue that, possibly, the hard problem is the wrong problem to pose.
Throughout the paper we compare and discuss the theories of David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett and Thomas Nagel. This is the main body of literature with which we examine Chalmers’ hard problem. To this end we include theories of, notably, Graham Harman, Timothy Morton and Bertell Ollman, in discussing how the concept of consciousness could be construed as a hyperobject, and how the methods of particularly David Chalmers might be understood as a somewhat shorthanded endeavor. In the very end of the paper we pose an explicitly Marxian and Kantian discussion of whether or not the premises of the hard problem might be an ineffective starting point for examining consciousness.
We end by concluding that Nagel’s and Chalmers’ theories do diverge from each other, notably between Nagel’s panpsychism and Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism. In this context panpsychism would not allow for phenomenal zombies, since all matter, in this theory, has conscious properties. Through Dennetts theories we see that Chalmers’ Hard Problem doesn’t pose a formidable problem for science, because it requires an inherent anti-scientific stance in regards to explaining consciousness. The materialist perspective would, furthermore, not allow for phenomenal zombies. If we construe the concept of consciousness as a hyperobject both materialism and dualism is mistaken because they only examine isolated parts of consciousness. We end by suggesting that the hard problem of consciousness isn’t the right problem to pose, if we want to explore the entirety of the concept of consciousness.
|Uddannelser||Filosofi og Videnskabsteori, (Bachelor/kandidatuddannelse) Bachelor|
|Udgivelsesdato||15 dec. 2016|
|Vejledere||Patrick Rowan Blackburn|