This study concers itself with the prior conditions regarding any cognition of causation. Its starting point is an investigation into David Humes theoretical critique of this cognition, in which he proposes the epistemoligical limits and possibilities – in other words, his scepticism – concerning causality as a field of knowledge: In particular, his rejection of the idea of the possibility of a certain knowledge of causal relations as persisting unaltered into the future, and his remark about this idea being merely a product of habitual experience of the causal relation in question. Humes results are next supplemented by an inquiry into Immanuel Kants critique thereof. Though he himself originally found great inspiration in the thoughts of Hume, he eventually felt the need to take distance from them; to fundamentally reconsider them. This foundation which he thoroughly investigated and its consequences, both in terms of cognition in general and the legitimacy of Humes results, will be examined. Through a close reading of the conflict between these two philosophical ideas, I will in the final analysis argue that instead of thinking Kant as completely rejecting Humes results – as easily could be thought – it rather is important to understand Kant as attempting to overcome Humes limitations. Instead of completely abandoning Hume, I will show how Kant impressively followed up – i.e. continued – on the path that Hume originally had laid out.
|Uddannelser||Basis - Humanistisk Bacheloruddannelse, (Bachelor uddannelse) Basis|
|Udgivelsesdato||25 jun. 2014|