Etisk vegetarisme: Moral Vegetarianism

Mads Peter Rommedahl & Signe Emalia Abildgaard Jensen

Studenteropgave: Semesterprojekt

Abstrakt

Resume: Dette projekt omhandler etisk vegetarisme, herunder hvilke argumenter for og mod etisk vegetarisme, der ses i den filosofiske debat om dyreetik. Ud fra de udvalgte argumenter undersøges det gennem filosofisk diskussion, hvorvidt kødspisning er etisk forsvarligt. Projektet tager udgangspunkt i et basalt argument for etisk vegetarisme, hvorefter tre indvendinger diskuteres. Indvendingerne er udvalgt ud fra det kriterie, at de er repræsentative for holdninger, der ofte ses i den generelle debat om etisk vegetarisme ikke alene inden for filosofi, men også i den ikke-faglige debat. De tre indvendinger diskuteres i henhold til de præmisser, de henholdsvis er opbygget af, idet indvendingernes holdbarheden herved kan afgøres. Ud fra diskussionen af præmisserne bag de tre indvendinger ses det, at indvendingerne hver især har præmisser, der enten kan tilbagevises eller er tvivlsomme i en sådan grad, at indvendingen ikke uden videre kan ses som holdbar. Det kan herved konkluderes, at de tre indvendinger, denne rapport behandler, ikke umiddelbart formår at påvise, at kødspisning er etisk forsvarligt. Dette betyder dog ikke nødvendigvis, at det ikke er etisk forsvarligt at spise kød, idet holdbarheden af flere af de behandlede præmisser fortsat er omdiskuteret i den filosofiske debat. Dette projekt påpeger således nødvendigheden af en fortsat bred filosofisk debat omkring etisk vegetarisme. Abstract: This paper discusses moral vegetarianism, as well as what arguments for or against moral vegetarianism are seen in the philosophical debate concerning animal ethics. Using the highlighted arguments as a starting point, the ethical status of meat-eating is examined through philosophical discussion. The paper is based off of a fundamental argument in favor of moral vegetarianism, followed by three objections to this view. The objections have been selected as to be representative for some of the most commonly encountered attitudes among those against the idea of moral vegetarianism, not just in the normative ethical debate, but in the non-academical discussion as well. The three objections are discussed from the point of the premises that they each employ, as this is seen as the most appropriate way to investigate their soundness. The discussion of the premises will show that each of the objections are based off of premises, that either can be outright rejected or are so dubious that the objection can not be considered as very probable. From this can be concluded that the three objections discussed in this paper are not immediately succesful in proving meat-eating to be morally defensible. This, however, does not necessarily mean that eating meat is morally indefensible, since the soundness of several of the discussed premises still remains subject to significant philosophical debate. This paper thus point out the need for a continued broad philosophical debate concerning animal ethics with regard to meat-eating.

UddannelserFilosofi og Videnskabsteori, (Bachelor/kandidatuddannelse) Bachelor el. kandidat
SprogDansk
Udgivelsesdato10 jan. 2014
VejledereRune Klingenberg Hansen

Emneord

  • etik
  • vegetarisme