Why mixed equilibria may not be conventions

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Resumé

In his Convention (1969) David Lewis defined conventions as behavioural regularities instantiating proper coordination equilibria made salient by precedent and operational by this being common knowledge. While later proponents of game theoretical approaches in the study of convention have agreed on dropping Lewis' eccentric ‘coordination' requirement as well as that of common knowledge, they are confused on whether conventions should be regarded as proper thereby precluding mixed equilibria. In this paper I argue that mixed equilibria may not be conventions, but also suggest that the reason for this reveals that though common knowledge is not necessary for a convention to operate, it may be utilized as to identify the conventional aspect of a given practice.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftDanish Yearbook of Philosophy
Vol/bind43
Sider (fra-til)41-68
Antal sider27
ISSN0070-2749
StatusUdgivet - 2008

Emneord

  • spilteori
  • konventionsteori
  • social filosofi
  • David Lewis
  • common knowledge

Citer dette

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Why mixed equilibria may not be conventions. / Hansen, Pelle Guldborg.

I: Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Bind 43, 2008, s. 41-68.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Why mixed equilibria may not be conventions

AU - Hansen, Pelle Guldborg

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AB - In his Convention (1969) David Lewis defined conventions as behavioural regularities instantiating proper coordination equilibria made salient by precedent and operational by this being common knowledge. While later proponents of game theoretical approaches in the study of convention have agreed on dropping Lewis' eccentric ‘coordination' requirement as well as that of common knowledge, they are confused on whether conventions should be regarded as proper thereby precluding mixed equilibria. In this paper I argue that mixed equilibria may not be conventions, but also suggest that the reason for this reveals that though common knowledge is not necessary for a convention to operate, it may be utilized as to identify the conventional aspect of a given practice.

KW - spilteori

KW - konventionsteori

KW - social filosofi

KW - David Lewis

KW - common knowledge

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KW - theory of convention

KW - social philosophy

KW - David Lewis

KW - common knowledge

M3 - Journal article

VL - 43

SP - 41

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JO - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy

JF - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy

SN - 0070-2749

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