Towards a Theory of Convention

    Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskning

    Resumé

    For snart tredive år siden udgav Lewis hans Convention: A Philosophical Study (Lewis 1969). Foruden at oprøre det logiske forskningssamfund gennem formuleringen af den første analyse a begrebet 'common knowledge', lagde dette værk også grundlaget for den formelle tilgang til studiet af social konventioner i en spilteoretisk optik. Ligesom for studiet af 'common knowledge' er der sket meget i dette sidste felt siden da. Lewis' konventionsteori er blevet udviklet og udstrakt til at dække mutiple typer af konventioner, såvel som et grundlag for studiet af sociale normer. Imidlertid dog, gennemgår den klassiske spilteori for tiden en alvorlig krise som et værktøj i forståelsen og forklaringen på sociale fænomener; en krise der tager udgangspunkt i equilibrium-selektionsproblemet omkring hvilket enhver konventionsteori må spindes. Den såkaldte evolutionære drejning inden for spilteorien står for en bevægelse væk fra de klassiske antagelser om perfekt rationalitet og 'common knowlegde' om disse til evolutionære teorirammer inspirerede af modeller udviklet af (Maynard Smith & Price 1973), (Taylor & Jonker 1978) and (Maynard Smith 1982). Ved at frembringe forklaringer på equilibrium selektion disse er tænkt som virkende som veldefinerede metaforer for læringsprocesser på hvilke en revideret konventionsteori kan genopstå. I denne artikel skitserer jeg en strategi for hvordan dette kan gøres, såvel som peger på nogle problemer og perspectiver som den evolutionære drejning efterlader i sine spor når denne bringes til at tjene i en konventionsteori.


    Udgivelsesdato: April
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TidsskriftPhi News
    Udgave nummer9
    Sider (fra-til)30-62
    Antal sider33
    ISSN1602-1444
    StatusUdgivet - 2006

    Bibliografisk note

    Lewis, David K.(1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study, reprinted by Blackwell Publishers, Ltd (2002).

    Maynard-Smith, J. & Price,, G. (1873) 'The Logic of Animal Conflict', Nature, 246:15-18

    Maynard Smith (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

    Taylor P. & Jonker, L. (1978) 'Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics', Mathematical Bio-sciences, 40:145-156

    Emneord

    • David Lewis
    • sociale normer
    • sociale konventioner
    • adfærdsnormer
    • spilteori
    • Robert Sugden
    • evolutionær spilteori
    • koordination
    • diskrimination
    • arbejdsdeling
    • fangernes dilemma
    • konventionsteori

    Citer dette

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    abstract = "Some thirty years ago Lewis published his Convention: A philosophical Study (Lewis 1969). Besides exciting the logical community by providing the seminal analysis work on common knowledge, it also laid the foundations for the formal approach to the study of social conventions by means of game theory. Like for the study of common knowledge much has happened in this latter field since then. The theory of convention has been developed and extended so as to include multiple types as well as a basis for the study of social norms. However, classical game theory is currently undergoing severe crisis as a tool for understanding and explaining social phenomena; a crisis emerging from the problem of equilibrium selection around which any theory of convention must revolve. The so-called evolutionary turn in game theory marks a transition from the classical assumptions of rationality and common knowledge of such to evolutionary game theoretical frameworks inspired by the models of (Maynard Smith & Price 1973), (Taylor & Jonker 1978) and (Maynard Smith 1982). By providing an account of equilibrium selection these are thought to work as well-defined metaphors of learning processes upon which a revised theory of convention may be erected. In this article I outline one way this might be done, as well as point to some problems and perspectives that the evolutionary turn leaves in its tracks when brought to serve in a theory of convention.",
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    Towards a Theory of Convention. / Hansen, Pelle Guldborg.

    I: Phi News, Nr. 9, 2006, s. 30-62.

    Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskning

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