Towards a Theory of Convention

Pelle Guldborg Hansen

Towards a Theory of Convention

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning

Abstract

For snart tredive år siden udgav Lewis hans Convention: A Philosophical Study (Lewis 1969). Foruden at oprøre det logiske forskningssamfund gennem formuleringen af den første analyse a begrebet 'common knowledge', lagde dette værk også grundlaget for den formelle tilgang til studiet af social konventioner i en spilteoretisk optik. Ligesom for studiet af 'common knowledge' er der sket meget i dette sidste felt siden da. Lewis' konventionsteori er blevet udviklet og udstrakt til at dække mutiple typer af konventioner, såvel som et grundlag for studiet af sociale normer. Imidlertid dog, gennemgår den klassiske spilteori for tiden en alvorlig krise som et værktøj i forståelsen og forklaringen på sociale fænomener; en krise der tager udgangspunkt i equilibrium-selektionsproblemet omkring hvilket enhver konventionsteori må spindes. Den såkaldte evolutionære drejning inden for spilteorien står for en bevægelse væk fra de klassiske antagelser om perfekt rationalitet og 'common knowlegde' om disse til evolutionære teorirammer inspirerede af modeller udviklet af (Maynard Smith & Price 1973), (Taylor & Jonker 1978) and (Maynard Smith 1982). Ved at frembringe forklaringer på equilibrium selektion disse er tænkt som virkende som veldefinerede metaforer for læringsprocesser på hvilke en revideret konventionsteori kan genopstå. I denne artikel skitserer jeg en strategi for hvordan dette kan gøres, såvel som peger på nogle problemer og perspectiver som den evolutionære drejning efterlader i sine spor når denne bringes til at tjene i en konventionsteori.

Udgivelsesdato: April

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Phi News
Udgave nummer	9
Sider (fra-til)	30-62
Antal sider	33
ISSN	1602-1444
Status	Udgivet - 2006

Bibliografisk note

Lewis, David K.(1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study, reprinted by Blackwell Publishers, Ltd (2002).

Maynard-Smith, J. & Price,, G. (1873) 'The Logic of Animal Conflict', Nature, 246:15-18

Maynard Smith (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Taylor P. & Jonker, L. (1978) 'Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics', Mathematical Bio-sciences, 40:145-156

Emneord

David Lewis
sociale normer
sociale konventioner
adfærdsnormer
spilteori
Robert Sugden
evolutionær spilteori
koordination
diskrimination
arbejdsdeling
fangernes dilemma
konventionsteori

Citer dette

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