Resumé
resources in Sub-Saharan Africa. An entire body of literature on the resource curse has developed which points to corruption during the negotiation of contracts, as well as the mismanagement of revenues on the continent. The analyses provide the basis for policy advice for countries as well as donors; transparency and anticorruption initiatives aimed at lifting the curse flourish. Though this paper is sympathetic to these initiatives, it argues that the analysis may underestimate the inherently political nature of the negotiation of contracts.
Based on a review of the existing literature on contract negotiations in Africa,
combined with a case study of Tanzania, the paper argues that the resource curse need not hit all countries on the African continent. By focusing on changes in the relative bargaining strength of actors involved in negotiating processes, it points to the choices and trade-offs that invariably affect the terms and conditions of exploration and production activities. Whereas international oil companies are often depicted as being in the driving seat, the last decade’s high oil prices may have shifted power in governments’ favor. Though their influence has declined, donors may still want to influence oil and gas politics under these circumstances. This requires careful analysis of the game. Support to building capacity in the institutions that govern and regulate the petroleum sector as well as to local communities and authorities may be avenues of engagement for donors.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Titel | Policies and finance for economic development and trade |
| Antal sider | 19 |
| Udgivelses sted | København |
| Forlag | Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) |
| Publikationsdato | 2014 |
| Sider | 27-46 |
| ISBN (Trykt) | 978-87-7605-718-3 |
| Status | Udgivet - 2014 |
| Udgivet eksternt | Ja |
| Navn | DIIS Report |
|---|---|
| Nummer | 25 |
Citer dette
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The politics of oil, gas contract negotiations in Sub-Saharan Africa. / Pedersen, Rasmus Hundsbæk.
Policies and finance for economic development and trade. København : Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), 2014. s. 27-46 (DIIS Report; Nr. 25).Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til rapport › Forskning › peer review
TY - GEN
T1 - The politics of oil, gas contract negotiations in Sub-Saharan Africa
AU - Pedersen, Rasmus Hundsbæk
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Much attention has been paid to the management of revenues from petroleumresources in Sub-Saharan Africa. An entire body of literature on the resource curse has developed which points to corruption during the negotiation of contracts, as well as the mismanagement of revenues on the continent. The analyses provide the basis for policy advice for countries as well as donors; transparency and anticorruption initiatives aimed at lifting the curse flourish. Though this paper is sympathetic to these initiatives, it argues that the analysis may underestimate the inherently political nature of the negotiation of contracts.Based on a review of the existing literature on contract negotiations in Africa,combined with a case study of Tanzania, the paper argues that the resource curse need not hit all countries on the African continent. By focusing on changes in the relative bargaining strength of actors involved in negotiating processes, it points to the choices and trade-offs that invariably affect the terms and conditions of exploration and production activities. Whereas international oil companies are often depicted as being in the driving seat, the last decade’s high oil prices may have shifted power in governments’ favor. Though their influence has declined, donors may still want to influence oil and gas politics under these circumstances. This requires careful analysis of the game. Support to building capacity in the institutions that govern and regulate the petroleum sector as well as to local communities and authorities may be avenues of engagement for donors.
AB - Much attention has been paid to the management of revenues from petroleumresources in Sub-Saharan Africa. An entire body of literature on the resource curse has developed which points to corruption during the negotiation of contracts, as well as the mismanagement of revenues on the continent. The analyses provide the basis for policy advice for countries as well as donors; transparency and anticorruption initiatives aimed at lifting the curse flourish. Though this paper is sympathetic to these initiatives, it argues that the analysis may underestimate the inherently political nature of the negotiation of contracts.Based on a review of the existing literature on contract negotiations in Africa,combined with a case study of Tanzania, the paper argues that the resource curse need not hit all countries on the African continent. By focusing on changes in the relative bargaining strength of actors involved in negotiating processes, it points to the choices and trade-offs that invariably affect the terms and conditions of exploration and production activities. Whereas international oil companies are often depicted as being in the driving seat, the last decade’s high oil prices may have shifted power in governments’ favor. Though their influence has declined, donors may still want to influence oil and gas politics under these circumstances. This requires careful analysis of the game. Support to building capacity in the institutions that govern and regulate the petroleum sector as well as to local communities and authorities may be avenues of engagement for donors.
M3 - Report chapter
SN - 978-87-7605-718-3
SP - 27
EP - 46
BT - Policies and finance for economic development and trade
PB - Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
CY - København
ER -