Resumé
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Moral Philosophy and Politics |
| Vol/bind | 2 |
| Udgave nummer | 2 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 299–327 |
| ISSN | 2194-5616 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - 2015 |
Bibliografisk note
Registered as Bronze Open Access in february 2018. If the link does not work please contact rucforsk(at)ruc.dkCiter dette
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Stealing Bread and Sleeping Beneath Bridges : Indirect Discrimination as Disadvantageous Equal Treatment. / Thomsen, Frej Klem.
I: Moral Philosophy and Politics, Bind 2, Nr. 2, 2015, s. 299–327.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › peer review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Stealing Bread and Sleeping Beneath Bridges
T2 - Indirect Discrimination as Disadvantageous Equal Treatment
AU - Thomsen, Frej Klem
N1 - Registered as Bronze Open Access in february 2018. If the link does not work please contact rucforsk(at)ruc.dk
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - The article analyses the concept of indirect discrimination, arguing first that existing conceptualizations are unsatisfactory and second that it is best understood as equal treatment that is disadvantageous to the discriminatees because of their group membership. I explore four ways of further refining the definition, arguing that only an added condition of moral wrongness is at once plausible and helpful, but that it entails a number of new problems that may outweigh its benefits. Finally, I suggest that the moral wrongness of indirect discrimination is best accounted for in terms of the harm it does to discriminatees and sketch three ways in which it may do so. I conclude that the analysis provides both a clearer understanding of the concept of indirect discrimination as well as indirect support for a harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, while suggesting that our moral obligations qua non-discrimination may be more extensive than is frequently assumed.
AB - The article analyses the concept of indirect discrimination, arguing first that existing conceptualizations are unsatisfactory and second that it is best understood as equal treatment that is disadvantageous to the discriminatees because of their group membership. I explore four ways of further refining the definition, arguing that only an added condition of moral wrongness is at once plausible and helpful, but that it entails a number of new problems that may outweigh its benefits. Finally, I suggest that the moral wrongness of indirect discrimination is best accounted for in terms of the harm it does to discriminatees and sketch three ways in which it may do so. I conclude that the analysis provides both a clearer understanding of the concept of indirect discrimination as well as indirect support for a harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, while suggesting that our moral obligations qua non-discrimination may be more extensive than is frequently assumed.
U2 - 10.1515/mopp-2014-0027
DO - 10.1515/mopp-2014-0027
M3 - Journal article
VL - 2
SP - 299
EP - 327
JO - Moral Philosophy and Politics
JF - Moral Philosophy and Politics
SN - 2194-5616
IS - 2
ER -