Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs

Torben Braüner; Patrick Rowan Blackburn; Irina Polyanskaya

Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Konferencebidrag i proceedings › Forskning › peer review

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Abstract

The literature on first-order false-belief is extensive, but less is known about the second-order case. The ability to handle second-order false-beliefs correctly seems to mark a cognitively significant step, but what is its status? Is it an example of *complexity only* development, or does it indicate that a more fundamental *conceptual change* has taken place? In this paper we extend Braüner's hybrid-logical analysis of first-order false-belief tasks to the second-order case, and argue that our analysis supports a version of the conceptual change position.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Titel	CogSci 2016 Proceedings : 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events
Redaktører	Anna Papafragou, Daniel Grodner, Daniel Mirman, John C. Trueswell
Antal sider	6
Udgivelsessted	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA
Forlag	Cognitive Science Society
Publikationsdato	2016
Sider	2579-2584
ISBN (Trykt)	978-0-9911967-3-9
ISBN (Elektronisk)	9780991196739
Status	Udgivet - 2016
Begivenhed	38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting : Recognizing and Representing Events - Philadelphia Convention Center , Philadelphia, USA Varighed: 10 aug. 2016 → 13 aug. 2016 http://www.cognitivesciencesociety.org/2015/09/26/cogsci-2016-recognizing-and-representing-events/

Konference

Konference	38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting
Lokation	Philadelphia Convention Center
Land/Område	USA
By	Philadelphia
Periode	10/08/2016 → 13/08/2016
Internetadresse	http://www.cognitivesciencesociety.org/2015/09/26/cogsci-2016-recognizing-and-representing-events/

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Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefsForlagets udgivne version, 144 KB

https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2016/papers/0445/paper0445.pdf

Hybrid-Logical Proofs at Work in Cognitive Psychology
Braüner, T. (Projektdeltager), Blackburn, P. R. (Projektdeltager) & Polyanskaya, I. (Projektdeltager)
VELUX FONDEN
01/01/2014 → 30/04/2019
Projekter: Projekt › Forskning

Citationsformater

Braüner, T., Blackburn, P. R., & Polyanskaya, I. (2016). Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs. I A. Papafragou, D. Grodner, D. Mirman, & J. C. Trueswell (red.), CogSci 2016 Proceedings: 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events (s. 2579-2584). Cognitive Science Society. https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2016/papers/0445/paper0445.pdf

Braüner, Torben ; Blackburn, Patrick Rowan ; Polyanskaya, Irina. / Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs. CogSci 2016 Proceedings: 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events. red. / Anna Papafragou ; Daniel Grodner ; Daniel Mirman ; John C. Trueswell. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA : Cognitive Science Society, 2016. s. 2579-2584

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title = "Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs",

abstract = "The literature on first-order false-belief is extensive, but less is known about the second-order case. The ability to handle second-order false-beliefs correctly seems to mark a cognitively significant step, but what is its status? Is it an example of *complexity only* development, or does it indicate that a more fundamental *conceptual change* has taken place? In this paper we extend Bra{\"u}ner's hybrid-logical analysis of first-order false-belief tasks to the second-order case, and argue that our analysis supports a version of the conceptual change position. ",

keywords = "Second-order false-belief tasks, belief formation, belief manipulation, complexity only, conceptual change, hybrid logic, natural deduction, recursion",

author = "Torben Bra{\"u}ner and Blackburn, \{Patrick Rowan\} and Irina Polyanskaya",

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Braüner, T , Blackburn, PR & Polyanskaya, I 2016, Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs. i A Papafragou, D Grodner, D Mirman & JC Trueswell (red), CogSci 2016 Proceedings: 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events. Cognitive Science Society, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, s. 2579-2584, 38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting , Philadelphia, USA, 10/08/2016. <https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2016/papers/0445/paper0445.pdf>

Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs. / Braüner, Torben ; Blackburn, Patrick Rowan; Polyanskaya, Irina.
CogSci 2016 Proceedings: 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society - Recognizing and Representing Events. red. / Anna Papafragou; Daniel Grodner; Daniel Mirman; John C. Trueswell. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA: Cognitive Science Society, 2016. s. 2579-2584.

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Konferencebidrag i proceedings › Forskning › peer review

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AU - Blackburn, Patrick Rowan

AU - Polyanskaya, Irina

PY - 2016

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KW - belief formation

KW - belief manipulation

KW - complexity only

KW - conceptual change

KW - hybrid logic

KW - natural deduction

KW - recursion

M3 - Article in proceedings

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A2 - Grodner, Daniel

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PB - Cognitive Science Society

CY - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA

T2 - 38th Annual Cognitive Science Society Meeting

Y2 - 10 August 2016 through 13 August 2016

ER -

Recursive belief manipulation and second-order false-beliefs

Abstract

Konference

Adgang til dokumentet

Projekter

Hybrid-Logical Proofs at Work in Cognitive Psychology

Citationsformater