Perpetrator Abhorrence

Disgust as a Stop Sign

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Most contemporary research on disgust can be divided into “disgust advocates” and “disgust skeptics.” The so-called advocates argue that disgust can have a positive influence on our moral judgment; skeptics warn that it can mislead us toward prejudice and discrimination. This article compares this disagreement to a structurally similar debate in the field of genocide studies concerning the phe- nomenon of “perpetrator abhorrence.” While some soldiers report having felt strong disgust in the moment of committing or witnessing atrocity, scholars dis- agree on whether such disgust is moral in nature. These empirical cases provide us with reasons to reconsider the normative features of disgust. Inspired by the conceptualization of disgust in Immanuel Kant and Aurel Kolnai, and as an alternative to both the disgust advocates and the skeptics, this article argues that the analogy of a stop sign can better help us define disgust responses.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftMetaphilosophy
Vol/bind45
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)270-287
Antal sider18
ISSN0026-1068
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 1 apr. 2014
Udgivet eksterntJa

Citer dette

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Perpetrator Abhorrence : Disgust as a Stop Sign. / Munch-Jurisic, Ditte Marie.

I: Metaphilosophy, Bind 45, Nr. 2, 01.04.2014, s. 270-287.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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