After decades of consistent refusal to curb international tax evasion, the US Biden administration has recently proposed an international scheme for taxing the world’s largest transnational companies. This article seeks to better understand why it is so difficult to develop an international scheme controlling tax evasion by examining the role played by neoliberal governmentalities and their link to sovereign power. It is argued that neoliberal governmentalities have been crucial in propagating a design of sovereign power that is conducive to tax competition and, ultimately, to tax evasion. Yet, these divergences also seem to provide a space for reforming current taxation regimes.
Important note from the Publisher regarding the attached version of the article: “This is an Accepted Manuscript version of the following article, accepted for publication in Journal of Political Power. Peter Triantafillou (2021) Neoliberal taxation regimes and the articulation of sovereign state power, Journal of Political Power, DOI: 10.1080/2158379X.2021.1969071. It is deposited under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.”