Moral Intuitions and the Expertice Defence

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Resumé

Are the moral intuitions of philosophers more reliable than the intuitions of people who are not philosophically trained? According to what has become known as ‘the expertise defence’, the answer is in the affirmative. This answer has been sustained by drawing on analogies to expertise in other fields. However, in this article it is argued that the analogies presuppose two assumptions – the causal assumption and the quality assumption – which are not satisfied in relation to philosophical expertise. Thus, it is suggested that there are reasons to be sceptical with regard to the expertise defence.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftAnalysis
Vol/bind73
Udgave nummer1
Sider (fra-til)3-9
ISSN0003-2638
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2013

Emneord

  • expertise defence
  • lay people
  • moral intuitions
  • trained philosophers

Citer dette

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Moral Intuitions and the Expertice Defence. / Ryberg, Jesper.

I: Analysis, Bind 73, Nr. 1, 2013, s. 3-9.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

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