Feasibility and Stability in Normative Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Udgivelsesdato: August
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEthical Theory and Moral Practice
Vol/bind9
Udgave nummer4
Sider (fra-til)399-416
Antal sider18
ISSN1386-2820
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2006
Udgivet eksterntJa

Bibliografisk note

Paper id:: 10.1007/s10677-006-9048-0

Citer dette

@article{de3d95300ffb11dfb779000ea68e967b,
title = "Feasibility and Stability in Normative Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism",
abstract = "Arguments from stability for liberal nationalism rely on considerations about conditions for the feasibility or stability of liberal political ideals and factual claims about the circumstances under which these conditions are fulfilled in order to argue for nationalist conclusions. Such reliance on factual claims has been criticised by among others G. A. Cohen in other contexts as ideological reifications of social reality. In order to assess whether arguments from stability within liberal nationalism, especially as formulated by David Miller, are vulnerable to a comparable critique, the rationale for their reliance on factual claims is discussed on the basis of a number of concerns in John Rawls's political liberalism. The concern with stability in liberal nationalism differs from stability in Rawls's work, mainly because of the stronger non-ideal or ‘realist' focus of the former. In so far as the ‘realism' of arguments from stability for liberal nationalism is recognized, they are not vulnerable to the reification charge. But if the arguments are construed as realist, this at the same time makes for other tensions within liberal nationalism.",
author = "Sune L{\ae}gaard",
note = "Paper id:: 10.1007/s10677-006-9048-0",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.1007/s10677-006-9048-0",
language = "English",
volume = "9",
pages = "399--416",
journal = "Ethical Theory and Moral Practice",
issn = "1386-2820",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "4",

}

Feasibility and Stability in Normative Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism. / Lægaard, Sune.

I: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Bind 9, Nr. 4, 2006, s. 399-416.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Feasibility and Stability in Normative Political Philosophy: The Case of Liberal Nationalism

AU - Lægaard, Sune

N1 - Paper id:: 10.1007/s10677-006-9048-0

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - Arguments from stability for liberal nationalism rely on considerations about conditions for the feasibility or stability of liberal political ideals and factual claims about the circumstances under which these conditions are fulfilled in order to argue for nationalist conclusions. Such reliance on factual claims has been criticised by among others G. A. Cohen in other contexts as ideological reifications of social reality. In order to assess whether arguments from stability within liberal nationalism, especially as formulated by David Miller, are vulnerable to a comparable critique, the rationale for their reliance on factual claims is discussed on the basis of a number of concerns in John Rawls's political liberalism. The concern with stability in liberal nationalism differs from stability in Rawls's work, mainly because of the stronger non-ideal or ‘realist' focus of the former. In so far as the ‘realism' of arguments from stability for liberal nationalism is recognized, they are not vulnerable to the reification charge. But if the arguments are construed as realist, this at the same time makes for other tensions within liberal nationalism.

AB - Arguments from stability for liberal nationalism rely on considerations about conditions for the feasibility or stability of liberal political ideals and factual claims about the circumstances under which these conditions are fulfilled in order to argue for nationalist conclusions. Such reliance on factual claims has been criticised by among others G. A. Cohen in other contexts as ideological reifications of social reality. In order to assess whether arguments from stability within liberal nationalism, especially as formulated by David Miller, are vulnerable to a comparable critique, the rationale for their reliance on factual claims is discussed on the basis of a number of concerns in John Rawls's political liberalism. The concern with stability in liberal nationalism differs from stability in Rawls's work, mainly because of the stronger non-ideal or ‘realist' focus of the former. In so far as the ‘realism' of arguments from stability for liberal nationalism is recognized, they are not vulnerable to the reification charge. But if the arguments are construed as realist, this at the same time makes for other tensions within liberal nationalism.

U2 - 10.1007/s10677-006-9048-0

DO - 10.1007/s10677-006-9048-0

M3 - Journal article

VL - 9

SP - 399

EP - 416

JO - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

JF - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

SN - 1386-2820

IS - 4

ER -