Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Chief executives in many parliamentary democracies have the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite a well-developed literature on the endogenous timing of parliamentary elections, political scientists know remarkably little about the strategic use of dissolution power to influence policymaking. To address this gap, we propose and empirically evaluate a theoretical model of legislative bargaining in the shadow of executive dissolution power. The model implies that the chief executive's public support and legislative strength, as well as the time until the next constitutionally mandated election, are important determinants of the use and effectiveness of dissolution threats in policymaking. Analyzing an original time-series data set from a multiparty parliamentary democracy, we find evidence in line with key empirical implications of the model.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftAmerican Journal of Political Science
Vol/bind59
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til)641-655
Antal sider15
ISSN0092-5853
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2015

Citer dette

@article{b3db1ed8addf4699b870815acd0e89ac,
title = "Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining",
abstract = "Chief executives in many parliamentary democracies have the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite a well-developed literature on the endogenous timing of parliamentary elections, political scientists know remarkably little about the strategic use of dissolution power to influence policymaking. To address this gap, we propose and empirically evaluate a theoretical model of legislative bargaining in the shadow of executive dissolution power. The model implies that the chief executive's public support and legislative strength, as well as the time until the next constitutionally mandated election, are important determinants of the use and effectiveness of dissolution threats in policymaking. Analyzing an original time-series data set from a multiparty parliamentary democracy, we find evidence in line with key empirical implications of the model.",
author = "Michael Becher and Christiansen, {Flemming Juul}",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1111/ajps.12146",
language = "English",
volume = "59",
pages = "641--655",
journal = "American Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0092-5853",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc",
number = "3",

}

Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining. / Becher, Michael; Christiansen, Flemming Juul.

I: American Journal of Political Science, Bind 59, Nr. 3, 2015, s. 641-655.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Dissolution Threats and Legislative Bargaining

AU - Becher, Michael

AU - Christiansen, Flemming Juul

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Chief executives in many parliamentary democracies have the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite a well-developed literature on the endogenous timing of parliamentary elections, political scientists know remarkably little about the strategic use of dissolution power to influence policymaking. To address this gap, we propose and empirically evaluate a theoretical model of legislative bargaining in the shadow of executive dissolution power. The model implies that the chief executive's public support and legislative strength, as well as the time until the next constitutionally mandated election, are important determinants of the use and effectiveness of dissolution threats in policymaking. Analyzing an original time-series data set from a multiparty parliamentary democracy, we find evidence in line with key empirical implications of the model.

AB - Chief executives in many parliamentary democracies have the power to dissolve the legislature. Despite a well-developed literature on the endogenous timing of parliamentary elections, political scientists know remarkably little about the strategic use of dissolution power to influence policymaking. To address this gap, we propose and empirically evaluate a theoretical model of legislative bargaining in the shadow of executive dissolution power. The model implies that the chief executive's public support and legislative strength, as well as the time until the next constitutionally mandated election, are important determinants of the use and effectiveness of dissolution threats in policymaking. Analyzing an original time-series data set from a multiparty parliamentary democracy, we find evidence in line with key empirical implications of the model.

U2 - 10.1111/ajps.12146

DO - 10.1111/ajps.12146

M3 - Journal article

VL - 59

SP - 641

EP - 655

JO - American Journal of Political Science

JF - American Journal of Political Science

SN - 0092-5853

IS - 3

ER -