Concept, principle, and norm-equality before the law reconsidered

Frej Klem Thomsen

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

Resumé

Despite the attention equality before the law has received, both laudatory and critical, peculiarly little has been done to precisely define it. The first ambition of this paper is to remedy this, by exploring the various ways in which a principle of equality before the law can be understood and suggest a concise definition. With a clearer understanding of the principle in hand we are better equipped to assess traditional critique of the principle. Doing so is the second ambition of this paper. I will argue that traditional criticisms are unpersuasive, but that there is a different, powerful argument against equality before the law. The third ambition of the paper is to argue that there is a sense, overlooked by both proponents and critics, in which the principle still captures something important, albeit at the cost of shifting from intrinsic to instrumental value.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftLegal Theory
Vol/bind24
Udgave nummer2
Sider (fra-til)103-134
ISSN1352-3252
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2018

Citer dette

Thomsen, Frej Klem. / Concept, principle, and norm-equality before the law reconsidered. I: Legal Theory. 2018 ; Bind 24, Nr. 2. s. 103-134.
@article{347657f5b5004ea7bb049f375a8c6752,
title = "Concept, principle, and norm-equality before the law reconsidered",
abstract = "Despite the attention equality before the law has received, both laudatory and critical, peculiarly little has been done to precisely define it. The first ambition of this paper is to remedy this, by exploring the various ways in which a principle of equality before the law can be understood and suggest a concise definition. With a clearer understanding of the principle in hand we are better equipped to assess traditional critique of the principle. Doing so is the second ambition of this paper. I will argue that traditional criticisms are unpersuasive, but that there is a different, powerful argument against equality before the law. The third ambition of the paper is to argue that there is a sense, overlooked by both proponents and critics, in which the principle still captures something important, albeit at the cost of shifting from intrinsic to instrumental value.",
author = "Thomsen, {Frej Klem}",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1017/S1352325218000071",
language = "English",
volume = "24",
pages = "103--134",
journal = "Legal Theory",
issn = "1352-3252",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "2",

}

Concept, principle, and norm-equality before the law reconsidered. / Thomsen, Frej Klem.

I: Legal Theory, Bind 24, Nr. 2, 2018, s. 103-134.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelForskningpeer review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Concept, principle, and norm-equality before the law reconsidered

AU - Thomsen, Frej Klem

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - Despite the attention equality before the law has received, both laudatory and critical, peculiarly little has been done to precisely define it. The first ambition of this paper is to remedy this, by exploring the various ways in which a principle of equality before the law can be understood and suggest a concise definition. With a clearer understanding of the principle in hand we are better equipped to assess traditional critique of the principle. Doing so is the second ambition of this paper. I will argue that traditional criticisms are unpersuasive, but that there is a different, powerful argument against equality before the law. The third ambition of the paper is to argue that there is a sense, overlooked by both proponents and critics, in which the principle still captures something important, albeit at the cost of shifting from intrinsic to instrumental value.

AB - Despite the attention equality before the law has received, both laudatory and critical, peculiarly little has been done to precisely define it. The first ambition of this paper is to remedy this, by exploring the various ways in which a principle of equality before the law can be understood and suggest a concise definition. With a clearer understanding of the principle in hand we are better equipped to assess traditional critique of the principle. Doing so is the second ambition of this paper. I will argue that traditional criticisms are unpersuasive, but that there is a different, powerful argument against equality before the law. The third ambition of the paper is to argue that there is a sense, overlooked by both proponents and critics, in which the principle still captures something important, albeit at the cost of shifting from intrinsic to instrumental value.

U2 - 10.1017/S1352325218000071

DO - 10.1017/S1352325218000071

M3 - Journal article

VL - 24

SP - 103

EP - 134

JO - Legal Theory

JF - Legal Theory

SN - 1352-3252

IS - 2

ER -