Abstract
In this article I critically examine a standard feature in conceptions of discrimination: the group-criterion, specifically the idea that there is a limited and definablegroup of traits that can form the basis of discrimination. I review two types of argument for the criterion. One focuses on inherently relevant groups and relies ultimately on luck-egalitarian principles; the other focuses on contextually relevant groups and relies ultimately on the badness of outcomes. I conclude that as neither type of argument is convincing, the criterion is morally arbitrary, and as such untenable. Finally, I suggest both some of the conceptual and some of the practical implications of abandoning the criterion.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
---|---|
Tidsskrift | Social Theory and Practice |
Vol/bind | 39 |
Udgave nummer | 1 |
Sider (fra-til) | 120-146 |
ISSN | 0037-802X |
Status | Udgivet - 2013 |
Emneord
- principles
- focus groups
- discrimination
- Political theory