Bounded rationality, information, legal protection, and non-trivial contractual problems: Their influence on interorganizational relations

Carsten Allan Koch

    Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskning

    Resumé

    This paper attempts to generalize findings of the traditional literature of transaction cost economics (Willamson, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1985; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson & Ouchi 1981) by introducing more general factors or variables. Two of the most important of these are that asset specificity is replaced by a more general condition, vulnerability, and that the so-called market failure condition is replaced by a condition called contractual non-triviality. Sufficient conditions for non-triviality are found in terms of specific set of values for the basic set of factors.

    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    Publikationsdato21 aug. 1992
    Antal sider39
    StatusUdgivet - 21 aug. 1992
    Begivenhed2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research - Yxtaholm, Sverige
    Varighed: 21 aug. 199223 aug. 1992
    Konferencens nummer: 2

    Konference

    Konference2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research
    Nummer2
    LandSverige
    ByYxtaholm
    Periode21/08/199223/08/1992

    Emneord

    • Asset specificity
    • Bounded rationality
    • Complexity
    • Contract
    • Goal incongruence
    • Human behaviour
    • Incomplete contracting
    • Market failure
    • Mechanisms of protection
    • Opportunism
    • Ouchi, W.G.
    • Relational contracting
    • Transaction
    • Transaction cost
    • Uncertainty
    • Williamson, Oliver E.

    Citer dette

    Koch, C. A. (1992). Bounded rationality, information, legal protection, and non-trivial contractual problems: Their influence on interorganizational relations. Afhandling præsenteret på 2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research, Yxtaholm, Sverige.
    Koch, Carsten Allan. / Bounded rationality, information, legal protection, and non-trivial contractual problems: Their influence on interorganizational relations. Afhandling præsenteret på 2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research, Yxtaholm, Sverige.39 s.
    @conference{4a3b0e6d454e4c30911771297f92f2eb,
    title = "Bounded rationality, information, legal protection, and non-trivial contractual problems: Their influence on interorganizational relations",
    abstract = "This paper attempts to generalize findings of the traditional literature of transaction cost economics (Willamson, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1985; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson & Ouchi 1981) by introducing more general factors or variables. Two of the most important of these are that asset specificity is replaced by a more general condition, vulnerability, and that the so-called market failure condition is replaced by a condition called contractual non-triviality. Sufficient conditions for non-triviality are found in terms of specific set of values for the basic set of factors.",
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    author = "Koch, {Carsten Allan}",
    year = "1992",
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    Koch, CA 1992, 'Bounded rationality, information, legal protection, and non-trivial contractual problems: Their influence on interorganizational relations' Paper fremlagt ved 2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research, Yxtaholm, Sverige, 21/08/1992 - 23/08/1992, .

    Bounded rationality, information, legal protection, and non-trivial contractual problems: Their influence on interorganizational relations. / Koch, Carsten Allan.

    1992. Afhandling præsenteret på 2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research, Yxtaholm, Sverige.

    Publikation: KonferencebidragPaperForskning

    TY - CONF

    T1 - Bounded rationality, information, legal protection, and non-trivial contractual problems: Their influence on interorganizational relations

    AU - Koch, Carsten Allan

    PY - 1992/8/21

    Y1 - 1992/8/21

    N2 - This paper attempts to generalize findings of the traditional literature of transaction cost economics (Willamson, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1985; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson & Ouchi 1981) by introducing more general factors or variables. Two of the most important of these are that asset specificity is replaced by a more general condition, vulnerability, and that the so-called market failure condition is replaced by a condition called contractual non-triviality. Sufficient conditions for non-triviality are found in terms of specific set of values for the basic set of factors.

    AB - This paper attempts to generalize findings of the traditional literature of transaction cost economics (Willamson, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1985; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson & Ouchi 1981) by introducing more general factors or variables. Two of the most important of these are that asset specificity is replaced by a more general condition, vulnerability, and that the so-called market failure condition is replaced by a condition called contractual non-triviality. Sufficient conditions for non-triviality are found in terms of specific set of values for the basic set of factors.

    KW - Asset specificity

    KW - Bounded rationality

    KW - Complexity

    KW - Contract

    KW - Goal incongruence

    KW - Human behaviour

    KW - Incomplete contracting

    KW - Market failure

    KW - Mechanisms of protection

    KW - Opportunism

    KW - Ouchi, W.G.

    KW - Relational contracting

    KW - Transaction

    KW - Transaction cost

    KW - Uncertainty

    KW - Williamson, Oliver E.

    KW - Asset specificity

    KW - Bounded rationality

    KW - Complexity

    KW - Contract

    KW - Goal incongruence

    KW - Human behaviour

    KW - Incomplete contracting

    KW - Market failure

    KW - Mechanisms of protection

    KW - Opportunism

    KW - Ouchi, W.G.

    KW - Relational contracting

    KW - Transaction

    KW - Transaction cost

    KW - Uncertainty

    KW - Williamson, Oliver E.

    M3 - Paper

    ER -

    Koch CA. Bounded rationality, information, legal protection, and non-trivial contractual problems: Their influence on interorganizational relations. 1992. Afhandling præsenteret på 2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research, Yxtaholm, Sverige.