This paper attempts to generalize findings of the traditional literature of transaction cost economics (Willamson, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1985; Ouchi, 1980; Williamson & Ouchi 1981) by introducing more general factors or variables. Two of the most important of these are that asset specificity is replaced by a more general condition, vulnerability, and that the so-called market failure condition is replaced by a condition called contractual non-triviality. Sufficient conditions for non-triviality are found in terms of specific set of values for the basic set of factors.
|Publikationsdato||21 aug. 1992|
|Status||Udgivet - 21 aug. 1992|
|Begivenhed||2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research - Yxtaholm, Sverige|
Varighed: 21 aug. 1992 → 23 aug. 1992
Konferencens nummer: 2
|Konference||2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research|
|Periode||21/08/1992 → 23/08/1992|
- Asset specificity
- Bounded rationality
- Goal incongruence
- Human behaviour
- Incomplete contracting
- Market failure
- Mechanisms of protection
- Ouchi, W.G.
- Relational contracting
- Transaction cost
- Williamson, Oliver E.
Koch, C. A. (1992). Bounded rationality, information, legal protection, and non-trivial contractual problems: Their influence on interorganizational relations. Afhandling præsenteret på 2nd Nordic Workshop on Interorganizational Research, Yxtaholm, Sverige.